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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant contends that the issue of residency, as it relates to jurisdiction, should not be 
considered by the Court because that issue was not specifically identified in the docketing 
statement or notice of appeal. However, both the docketing statement and the notice of appeal 
address the issue of jurisdiction, which is the issue on appeal. The difference between the 
docketing statement and the brief is that Plaintiff subdivided the issue of jurisdiction into two 
parts for purposes of argument in the brief. Both arguments concerning jurisdiction have been 
raised throughout this litigation. Defendant had ample notice of the issues presented by Plaintiff 
in her brief. 
Even if Plaintiff were required to subdivide the jurisdiction issue in her docketing 
statement, that would not be fatal error with regard to the residency issue. State and federal case 
law proscribe that the merits of an appeal be heard and not dismissed because of technical 
defects. Defendant makes no claim that the alleged defect in the docketing statement unfairly 
prejudiced him for purposes of responding to the issues on appeal. Therefore, this Court should 
not deny Plaintiff the opportunity to argue the merits of her appeal. 
Finally, with regard to the docketing statement issue, if the Court determines that the 
docketing statement is defective, Plaintiff requests leave of the Court to amend the docketing 
statement to subdivide the jurisdictional issue in order to separately identify the issue as it relates 
to residency and to the location where the cause of action arose. 
Defendant's assertion that Utah's long-arm statute does not extend jurisdiction over him 
is erroneous. Defendant's repeated acts, on record in this case, clearly fall within the scope of 
the enumerated activities in Utah's long-arm statute. Further, his long history of both business 
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and marital contacts in the state of Utah make it reasonable and fair for him to foresee being 
brought into court in this state. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
I, WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
BECAUSE THE PARTIES RESIDED IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP, 
WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH, IS AN ISSUE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT AND SHOULD BE HEARD ON APPEAL. 
A. Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the contents of the docketing 
statement. Subsection c(5) directs, in part, that the docketing statement include "the issues 
presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case, but without 
unnecessary detail." It further directs that "the questions should not be repetitious." Utah R. 
App. P. 9c(5). Plaintiff complied with both the letter and the spirit of Rule 9. The rule 
discourages unnecessary detail or repetition because "the docketing statement is not meant to be 
a brief or to present arguments." Utah R. App. P. 9(b). Nor is it intended for use by the 
Appellee, but by the Court in processing the appeal. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 
(Utah 1996). 
The issue of jurisdiction was argued below and subsequently included in Plaintiffs 
docketing statement and brief for this appeal. While she subdivided the issue of jurisdiction into 
two separate questions for purposes of the brief, she did not raise any new issue. In fact, 
Plaintiffs arguments in favor of exercising jurisdiction over Defendant have remained the same 
throughout this litigation. This accounts for the actual reference to the residency issue in the 
docketing statement itself. (See EXHIBIT Rl) 
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The notice of appeal states that "the appeal is taken from such part of the Judgment that 
dismisses all issues except for the issue of divorcing the parties themselves. (See EXHIBIT R2) 
This logically includes the issue of residency argued before the trial court. It follows that 
Defendant had more than adequate notice as to the arguments raised on appeal. Accordingly, 
Defendant has not been unduly prejudiced, nor has he claimed such. 
B. Any alleged defect in the docketing statement does not warrant this Court 
dismissing the issue of residency as a basis for jurisdiction. 
Even if Rule 9 required that Plaintiff specifically include the residency argument in the 
docketing statement, this would not preclude the Court from hearing that issue on appeal. 
Subsection (b) of Rule 9 directs that the docketing statement is intended for use by the Court in 
assigning, classifying, prioritizing and calendaring cases. Accordingly, any deficiencies in the 
docketing statement would be raised by the Court and not by the Defendant. 
To deny Plaintiff the opportunity to argue the merits of her appeal based on Defendant's 
dissatisfaction with the docketing statement would run contrary to well established policy and 
case law. Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have ruled on this issue. In 
particular, the Utah Supreme Court resolved that even where an appellant failed to list all of the 
issues for review in his docketing statement, it did not affect his right to raise the issues on 
appeal since they were thoroughly discussed in his brief. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 
568 (Utah 1996). 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the policy regarding defects in procedure and 
the effect of these defects on an appeal. That court announced that, while practitioners are 
expected to carefully comply with procedural rules, "case law interpreting those rules is founded 
upon a policy which favors deciding cases on the merits as opposed to dismissing them because 
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of minor technical defects." Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co.. 119 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff should be allowed to argue the merits of 
her appeal despite Defendant's dissatisfaction with the form of her docketing statement. 
Finally, if there is a defect in the docketing statement, Plaintiff requests that this Court 
exercise its authority under Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to permit Plaintiff to 
amend the docketing statement to correct that defect. 
II. UNDER THE TWO-PART INQUIRY IN KAMDAR. THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT. 
Defendant contends that under the two-part inquiry, outlined in Kamdar & Company v. 
Larav Company, 815 P.2d 245 (Ut. App. 1991), Utah lacks jurisdiction over him. Yet, 
Defendant has purposefully availed himself of activities and privileges that satisfy the 
requirements for asserting jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute. Consequently, it is not 
unreasonable for him to foresee being hailed into court here. 
Defendant, in his brief, properly identified the two-step analysis in Kamdar. First, claims 
against the person must arise from the activities enumerated in UCA §78-27-24, and second, the 
defendant's contacts must be sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without violation of 
due process. Kamdar & Company, 815 P.2d at 248. However, Defendant failed to mention that, 
as recently as 1998, the Legislature amended §78-27-24, and replaced the language "arising 
from" with "arising out of or related to," effectively expanding the basis for exercising the 
State's jurisdictional powers. Accordingly, Defendant's repeated activities within Utah, 
including work, (R. at 27-28), membership in a Utah union, (R. at 29-30), hospitalization, (R. at 
29), use of alcohol, (R. at 106 pages 13-17), and temporary residence for extended periods of 
time in the marital relationship, (R. at 28-29), fit squarely within the enumerated acts giving rise 
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to personal jurisdiction under §78-27-24. The clear trend, as evidenced by the Legislature's 
recent amendment, is to favor the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents in cases such as this 
one. 
Utah's exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant will not violate the due process clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. Defendant is not deprived of due process by being hailed into court in a 
state in which he purposefully and repeatedly worked, stayed, and visited over a number of years. 
His work activities alone, coupled with his membership in the local union, make it foreseeable 
that he might be hailed into court within the State of Utah. Similarly, maintaining an action in 
the same state will not place an undue hardship on the Defendant. Contrary to Defendant's 
argument, it makes no difference, for purposes of §78-27-24, that his assets and actual domicile 
are in the state of Idaho. Utah's long-arm statute was intended to apply in precisely this 
situation. Finally, Defendant urges this Court to adopt a definition of "reside within the 
marital relationship" under §78-27-24 that mirrors the definition of residency under §30-3-1(2). 
However, §30-3-1(2) requires actual and bona fide residency for purposes of exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction, whereas, §78-27-24 requires only that the a person "resided within the 
marital relationship, within this state" for purposes of establishing the minimum contacts 
necessary for in personam jurisdiction over non-residents. Subject matter jurisdiction and in 
personam jurisdiction are two distinct forms of jurisdiction, requiring different standards. They 
are set forth in two different sections of the Code. The definition of residency, in one section, 
can not be adopted for purposes of the other, without effectively changing the law as originally 
drafted. Had the Legislature intended that a non-resident, in a divorce proceeding, be an actual 
and bona fide resident, it could have drafted or subsequently amended the language to that effect. 
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Since it has not, Defendant's request that this Court adopt the same definition of residency for 
both sections should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff complied with Rule 9. Defendant had adequate notice of the issues on appeal; 
the issues have not changed from those mentioned to the court below. Defendant is attempting to 
dispose of Plaintiff s ability to argue the merits of her appeal based on a technicality. Nowhere 
in his response does Defendant claim that the alleged deficiency in the docketing statement 
unfairly prejudices his ability to respond to the issues. Defendant does not cite to any case law 
on point that indicates that an issue is deemed to have been waived based on an appellee's 
dissatisfaction with the docketing statement. Therefore, the issue of residency, as it pertains to 
jurisdiction, should be heard and decided by this Court. 
Defendant's analysis of Utah law regarding long-arm jurisdiction is erroneous because 
Defendant's activities fall well within the scope of enumerated acts justifying the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Likewise, Defendant's numerous contacts with the 
State make it reasonable for him to expect to be hailed into a Utah court. Accordingly, the trial 
court would not violate Defendant's due process rights by exercising personal jurisdiction over 
him. This case fits squarely within the activities contemplated to give rise to long-arm 
jurisdiction under UCA §78-27-24. 
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Based on the foregoing, the trial court's Order dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint 
should be set aside and the Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed to a trial on the merits in the 
State of Utah to resolve the remaining issues between the parties. 
DATED this Jd?L day of _ _ 6 ^ r ^ r , 1999. 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
I, G. Michael Westfall, certify that on May , 1999,1 served two copies of the attached 
Reply Brief of Appellant upon LaMar J. Winward, the counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
LaMar J. Winward 
150 North 200 East, #204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET LUCILE LENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORMAN FLOYD LENT, 
Defendant. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Civil No. 981568-CA 
Judge 
Pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaint/Appellant Margaret Lucille 
Lent, hereby submits her Docketing Statement. 
1 DA TE OF ENTR Y OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM. 
Order of Dismissal, entered August 3, 1998 
2. NA TURE OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTION(S) AND DA TE(S) FILED. 
There have been no post-judgment motions filed. 
3. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on September 1, 1998. 
EXHIBIT 
R - l 
4. JURISDICTION: 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(h), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
5. NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY: 
This appeal is from an Order of Dismissal entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court 
in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate, presiding. Said 
Order of Dismissal dismissed all of Plaintiff s claims in a divorce proceeding except her request that 
the marriage be terminated. The Fifth District Court ruled that, although it had jurisdiction over the 
marriage and could therefore dissolve the same, it had no jurisdiction over Defendant. 
6. STA TEMENT OF FACTS: 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce in this matter on May 14, 1997. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on or about September 10, 1997, 
claiming that he had not resided in Utah with Plaintiff during their marriage. 
In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had 
lived and worked in Utah on several occasions during the marriage while he worked on projects in 
this state. Plaintiff also alleged that one of the differences between the parties that resulted in the 
action for divorce was Defendant's marital infidelity which occurred in Utah while he was working 
and living in this state. 
Plaintiff also claimed that Defendant had stayed at her residence in Utah on several 
occasions since she moved here in 1992, but she acknowledged they had not shared the same bed 
during those stays. 
2 f l H X H I B r T 
At a hearing held on November 10, 1997, the Trial Court denied the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
As he was permitted to do, Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss on June 16, 
1998, this time supported by his Affidavit, claiming that he had not engaged in any extra-marital 
relationship within the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff responded to this Second Motion to Dismiss by acknowledging that she 
could not prove that Defendant's acts of infidelity occurred within the borders of the State of Utah, 
but maintained that he was living in Utah when the infidelity occurred. 
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was combined with a 
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion o Bifurcate, Plaintiff testified that grounds for the divorce included 
differences arising out of Defendant's excessive use of alcohol and that he had committed those acts 
in Utah. The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate, finding that it had jurisdiction over the 
marriage, but also granted the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Defendant did not have sufficient 
contacts with Utah for the Court to determine any issues other than dissolution of the marriage. This 
appeal followed that Order of Dismissal. 
7. ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A. ISSUE: 
Did the Trial Court err by ruling that Utah does not have jurisdiction over 
Defendant where acts that created the irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties and 
which were relied on in granting the Decree of Divorce occurred in the State of Utah? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
3 | E X H I B I T 
I f *>- 1 
The standard of review of this appeal is de novo because the issue of 
jurisdiction is one of law. See Liska v Liska. 902 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah App. 1995); Holm v 
Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157, 160 (Utah Ap 1992). 
8. DETERMINA TION OF CASE BY SUPREME COUR T: 
Not applicable—the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal. 
9. DETERMINA TIVE LA W\ 
U.C.A. §78-27-24(6) 
10. RELA TED APPEALS: 
None. 
11. ATTACHMENTS: 
a. Bifurcated Decree of Divorce filed August 11, 1998. 
b. Order of Dismissal filed August 3, 1998. 
c. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Re: Bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce, filed August 11, 1998. 
c. Notice of Appeal filed September 1, 1998. 
DATED this  
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
EXHIBIT 
IS < M 
COPY 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434 
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St. George, UT 84770 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET LUCILE LENT, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NORMAN FLOYD LENT, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 974500368 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff/Appellant, Margaret Lucille Lent, by and through her 
attorney of record, G. Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & 
WRIGHT, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final Order of Dismissal of the 
Honorable James L. Shumate entered in this matter on August 3,1998. The appeal is taken from 
such part of the Judgment that dismisses all issues except for the issue of divorcing the parties 
themselves. _^ 
DATED this fo4 day of ItyftfoliA/^ , 1998. 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX^ WRIGHT 
